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THE ANALYSIS OF THE CHARACTERISTIC CONCEPTS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HISTORICAL, SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES

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Bogatchuk S., Mazylo I., Belkin I., Mangora V., Makarov Z.

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1.2 Railway transport of Ukraine during the German-Soviet war the war and the first post-war years

Y. Dyakov, known as a researcher of the history of transport and road construction in the USSR in 1941-1945 states: "Every war, especially the past, was based on transport with all its severity" [57, p. 3] which in those years became an object of strategic importance, providing an unbreakable connection between the front and the rear, and therefore the possibility of successful and not quite military operations. The phenomenon in the activity of railway transport consisted in the fact that it ensured a close connection between the front and the rear, which created quite a few advantages. Its special role in the conditions of the war is proved by the unprecedented scale and pace of the evacuation of material resources and people of Ukraine in 1941-1942. And even during the evacuation epic, transport was subordinated to military needs. The situation demanded the transport of a large number of military reinforcements, weapons and ammunition to the front. Only the railways could perform these tasks. Railway transport should be considered as one of the important factors on which the course of events on the fronts and the solution of economic and social problems depended.

It is worth emphasizing that due to the objective circumstances of that time, railway transport was an object of increased danger, being one of the main goals for Hitler's conquerors. So, during the last war, 5,180 bombs were dropped on the important Kupyansk railway junction in the Kharkiv region, and another 1,348 exploded nearby. Since August 1941, there has not been a day when enemy planes did not appear over the station [58, p. 96]. In the pre-war period, railway transport provided 95 percent of all transportation on the territory of Ukraine, [59, p. 409] the length of which tracks reached 20,102 kilometers,³ [60, p. 4] out of 137,000 km of the operational length of railways of the USSR, including 106, 1,000 km in the system of the National Railways and Railways [57, p. 36]. Nine roads were in operation - Vinnytsia, Kovel, Lviv, Odesa, South, South-West, South-Donetsk, North-Donetsk and Stalinsk (now Prydniprovsk) highways. They employed 348,000 workers who

served railway networks 5 [61, p. 385] out of 2,821,000 of all employees in the NKSHS system [62, p. 56].

In 1939-1940, the railways of Halychyna and Bukovyna were included in the transport system of the Ukrainian SSR. The length of railways in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus was 6.7 thousand km, including 4.9 thousand km of single-track and 1.8 thousand km of double-track lines [63, p. 24]. In Chernivtsi region, in accordance with Soviet laws, 426 kilometers of railway tracks, 5 locomotive and wagon depots, 46 railway stations, 2100 km of telegraph and telephone lines were declared state property [64, p. 37]. It is worth noting that Western Ukraine and Western Belarus had bad roads [63, p. 18] with insufficient bandwidth [57, p. 35]. In the Western regions of Ukraine there were railway junctions with a large number of approaches - Kovel, Rivne, Lviv, which were poorly equipped. The station tracks were not long enough, most of the switches were operated manually [63, p. 24]. In 1940 and the first half of 1941, transport construction began on the western border of the USSR. The tracks Lviv – Peremeshl, Proskuriv, Ternopil – Lviv – Yavoriv - state border were under reconstruction [65, p. 43]. During the war, transport became the main chain of communication between the front and the rear. At the initial stage of the war, railway workers carried out military and evacuation transportation. From the beginning of hostilities, the front needed an increasing number of material and human resources. I.V. Kovalev, the former People's Commissar of Communications, claimed: "that in just one week, the load of military echelons and transport on the railways of the USSR was more than one and a half times greater than the load of military echelons of Tsarist Russia in 1914, the entire period of concentration, which lasted about two months" [62, p. 84]. Therefore, operational transportation from June 23 to 24, 1941 reached 29.4% of the total loading of roads [66, p. 169].

It was the railway transport that bore the brunt of the massive relocation from the interior districts to the front line. During the autumn-summer period of 1941, the railwaymen relocated 291 rifle divisions, four rifle corps. During the first forty days, 2 million 500 tons of goods were delivered to the front [62, p. 86].

The next important task was the logistical support of the troops. Therefore,

military transportation in the republic in the first one and a half months accounted for 72.5% of the total cargo flow [67, p. 124].

However, it turned out that the railway industry of the border regions was not sufficiently developed in terms of technology due to "deadlock until 1939 and 1940s, until the time of the annexation of its western regions and Bukovyna to Ukraine" 17 [68, p. 2]. This confirms the fact of an increase in the volume of transportation at the stations close to the borders with Poland and Bessarabia" [68, p. 2].

Name of the district	1937	1940	1947	1952
	There From	There From	There From	There From
Grechany-Pidvolochynsk	- -	1672 809	1160 1225	1240 1345
Zhmerinka-Grechany	884 705	1412 2209	1335 1750	2800 1750

Vinnytsia Railway was formed in 1940 for more effective use of the border railways before 1939. The highway became an important part of the economy of Podillia and the whole of Ukraine. Its tracks crossed the territory of the former two border regions - Vinnytsia and Kamianets-Podilsk and had direct access to the newly created border railways - the Lviv and Kovel highways. Therefore, the management of the Vinnytsia Railway, starting in 1940, contributed to the expansion of the railway network on the territory of the Podilsk Territory. The Vanyarka-Yampil narrow-gauge line was being built [69, p. 104].

With the beginning of the war, the problem of restructuring the operation of transport on a military basis was solved. In order to overcome the numerous difficulties in the work of railway transport, the People's Commissariat of Railways (hereafter NKSHS), from 18:00 on June 24, introduced the use of a military parallel schedule, which operated until May 1942. It was called parallel because all echelons, cargo and passenger ones were delivered at the same speed, had the same weight, which greatly simplified the formation, movement and downtime at stations [63, p. 45]. Also, work on the railway was transferred to a special military schedule - the letters "A", which provided for the rapid advancement, first of all, of military echelons and cargo related to mobilization transportation [62, p. 73]. A state of siege was also imposed on the

Lviv, Vinnytsia, South-Western and other highways [70, p. 22, 79].

In addition to purely military-administrative methods in the organization of transport work, a characteristic feature of the first months of the war was a massive labor upsurge among transport workers [70, p. 22, 83]. Many railway workers managed to switch to the Lunin methods of work, took care of steam locomotives on their own, eliminated various damages, and carried out current repairs [70, p. 28].

The transportation of troops and cargo took place in extremely difficult conditions. The railwaymen had to overcome considerable difficulties. On June 28, 1941, a large number of echelons accumulated on the Vinnytsia highway, which greatly complicated the work. Therefore, a movement was launched on the railway to accelerate the passage of echelons to the front line. Railway workers Redko and Berchak distinguished themselves. According to the military schedule, 8 pairs of trains per day were supposed to pass at the Yarmolyntsi-Husyatyn section. Berchak processed 29 echelons on July 3, 38 on July 5, and 45 on July 6 [71, p. 71].

A characteristic feature of the work of railway transport in Ukraine during the war was that the system and workers were under attack by German and Soviet aircraft during the occupation, which bombed stations and rolling stock.

M. Khrushchev, (in 1941 a member of the Military Council of the South-Western direction), noted on this occasion: "The Germans flew with impunity and we had nothing with which we could defend ourselves" [80, p. 18]. Therefore, in July 1941 alone, the enemy bombed transport facilities 1,470 times [63, p. 59]. In total, during the war, fascist aviation carried out 19,863 attacks, of which 11,326 caused various damages, of which 3,949 led to traffic delays [72, p. 54]. Kalynivka station of the Vinnytsia highway was bombed 12 times in June-July [70, p. 36]. From June 22 to September 6, 1941, 5,500 aerial bombs were dropped on the objects of the Odessa highway. The enemy carried out 18 massive air strikes on the Shevchenkovo station of the same highway [73, p. 4]. Node stations Kyiv, Lviv, Drohobych, Stanislav, Rava-Ruska and others were damaged. To eliminate the consequences of the bombings, road administrations organized special teams that extinguished fires and rescued people. There were 568 such groups numbering 5,500 people on the North-Donetsk highway

[67, p. 126]. The railwaymen themselves actively struggled with the consequences of the bombings. A qualified approach to the matter contributed to the fact that train traffic, as was the case on the Odesa highway, did not stop for more than 2-3 hours, on the South-Western - 4 hours [74, p. 13]. Only in some places the trains did not move for a day or more. A significant amount of restoration work was carried out by 8 specialized trains of the North-Donets Railway. Only from February 1 to February 26, 1942. they made almost 200 visits to damaged objects and restored 106 locomotives, 987 wagons, 200,000 meters of railway track, 42 switches and 3 bridges [67, p. 126].

Simultaneously with the attacks of the enemy aircraft, numerous saboteurs tried to disrupt the operation of transport. The railway administration has increased the number of paramilitary and civil guards. On the South-Western highway at the beginning of August 1941, 2,200 people joined the security units [75, p. 45]. On Stalinskaya (now Pidennaya) there were 19 of them (44 men each) [62, p. 66]. A detachment of 1,000 militiamen was created at the Poltava Locomotive Repair Plant, whose fighters, in addition to directly participating in hostilities, worked on the reconstruction of transport facilities [75, p. 288].

In extremely difficult conditions, the railway workers of the front-line highways had to escort echelons to the front line. The station depot driver Zhmerinka Datsko, returning from another flight, learned that an important cargo was at the station and, in the absence of free crews, again led the echelons to the front line. On the Yurkivka-Zhuravka race, he died during an attack by enemy aircraft. His assistant brought the train to the destination station [76, p. 71].

During the defensive battles in Ukraine, armored trains built by railwaymen helped the soldiers of the Red Army hold back the advancing enemy units. The workers of the Kyiv Locomotive Repair Plant started its construction at their own expense and developed the technical documentation themselves. 100 employees of the South-Western Railway were part of the crew. A. Tykhod was appointed commander, and L. Vasylevsky was appointed deputy head of the plant department [74, p. 33]. The crew of the "Letter-A" armored train received their first baptism of fire in the Novohrad-Volynsky region on July 11, 1941 [77, p. 79-80]. He completed the next task in the

battles for the Korosten station. The fascists, trying to break through in the direction of Kyiv, threw out an amphibious detachment with the aim of seizing the section of the Korosten-Novograd-Volynskyi road. In this direction, the soldiers of the armored train managed to destroy the enemy and capture considerable trophies [78, p. 205].

On July 20, the team of the armored train "Letter-B" went on its first combat flight [79]. His fighters, together with the team of the "Letter-A" armored train, held the defense in the direction of Fastiv-Kyiv, Teteriv-Irpin [79]. At the beginning of August, they held the defense of the Zhulyana-Boyarka precinct [79]. When the enemy pulled up tanks in the Irpen area, the crews of armored trains supported the units that were on the defensive. On September 19, 1941, the "Letter-A" armored train received the task of breaking through the immediate defense area of Kyiv and carrying out a raid on the territory captured by the enemy. However, in the area of the Pereyaslav station, the fascists managed to block its movement. Then the crew made a decision to blow up the armored train and get out of the encirclement themselves, which lasted for 23 days [80, p. 64]. Some fighters reached the front line, others joined partisan units [81, p. 64]. Together with the crew of armored trains, teams of fighter battalions, staffed by railroad workers of the South-Western Main Line, fought with the enemy [74, p. 69]. Thus, at the end of August 1941, when the fascist military units entrenched themselves in one of the villages near the Vorzel station, and the crew of the "Letter-A" armored train together with the Opelchensky paratroopers knocked them out, another fascist landing force managed to capture the Zhulyany station, where the retreating the Soviet units left a wagon with aviation equipment. The crew of the armored train did everything to save him. To do this, they rebuilt a part of the destroyed railway bed overnight, which made it possible to knock out the enemy from the station and remove the equipment [74, p. 40].

Also, armored trains were built together with the workers of the Kyiv Steam Locomotive Repair Plant by the workers of the Bolshovyk plant in Darnytskyi [74, p. 33, 34]. The construction of armored trains on the highways of Donbass and Prydniprovyia, in more economically developed regions, was established. At the beginning of the defense of Odessa, there were three armored trains on the front line,

built by the workers of the local factory named after January Uprising [82, p. 63, 122]. Subsequently, Odesa railwaymen built two armored trains - "Choromorets" and "Za Batkivshchyna" [82, p. 53].

At the same time, the transport workers, taking part in defensive battles, performed another extremely important task - evacuating a large number of enterprises and material resources to the rear areas of the country. Their activities became extremely important under the conditions of the rapid advance of the enemy on the territory of the republic. Railway transport was the most ready to fulfill this task. Even in pre-war times in Ukraine, his network was quite dense, especially in the regions of Donbass and Dnieper. Road transport was not counted on. The government transferred most of it to the disposal of the active army. As a result, the number of trucks in the national economy decreased by more than two. A significant part of tractors and heavy vehicles were given to the army. The first months of the war demonstrated the weak readiness of water transport for this type of transportation. In addition, water arteries crossed the territory of the republic from north to south. River transport could not be involved in the transportation of evacuation cargo. Therefore, during 1941 - the first half of 1942, the bulk of transportation was carried out by workers of the South-Western, South-Donetsk, North-Donetsk, Stalinsk and Southern highways, the routes of which were located in the industrial areas of Ukraine.

Railway workers of the Vinnytsia main line took on the main burden of evacuating means of production of material resources and population from the Vinnytsia, Kamianets-Podilskyi and Zhytomyr regions [76, p. 72]. The evacuation processes carried out by them affected mainly the collectives of the largest industrial enterprises and some categories of the population of administrative centers.

Evacuation from the large industrial areas of the Dnieper region, the Black Sea region, the Left Bank of Ukraine and Donbas was managed in a more organized manner.

From Kyiv to August 5, 1941, railway workers loaded 85,295 wagons [70, p. 55]. During the entire 2-month evacuation period, they managed to take out 197 enterprises, of which 64 were of Union and 88 of republican importance, 45 of local

industry [70, p. 55].

150 enterprises, 190,069 tons of equipment, metals, materials and other valuables were exported from the city of Odessa and the region [74, p. 17-a]. Due to the rapid advance of the enemy, a large number of locomotives and 4,500 wagons with military cargo remained at the railway stations near the city [83, p. 3]. Another part of the equipment was evacuated by sea. So, the first dock with 26 steam locomotives sailed from Odessa on August 7, 1941. En route, it was bombed by enemy aircraft. Only one locomotive was seriously damaged. On the last morning of August 8, they were sent to the city of Mykolaiv, from where they were sent with echelons with factory equipment to the interior of the country [83, p. 5].

In August, evacuation began from the cities of Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kryvyi Rih. The People's Commissariat of Communications was asked to allocate 5,080 wagons every day [84, p. 39]. The main cargo from Dnieper and Crimea passed through the Stalin (now Southern) highway. In a short period of time, it was possible to evacuate 20 ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy enterprises from the right bank of the Dnipro River with the direct participation of railway workers. Large enterprises "Dzerzhynskrud", "Lenrud" and others were evacuated from Kryvyi Rih.

The evacuation of enterprises in Zaporizhzhia took place from August 19 to October 3, 1941. For 45 days, work on the removal of equipment was carried out under the fire of enemy artillery and air bombardment by aviation. In total, the railwaymen shipped 16,000 wagons weighing 320 tons. It was also possible to export 8,000 wagons of ferrous and non-ferrous metals [85, p. 18].

On September 16, 1941, the evacuation of Kharkiv began. Using the available potential, the railwaymen managed to send 320 echelons with people to the east by October 20, and by October 22 rolling stock of the Southern Railway [86, p. 118].

From Donbas in a short period of time - from July to October 1941, railwaymen managed to evacuate 177 factories and enterprises of the Union and 289 republican subordination, as well as 83 enterprises of industrial cooperation [74, p. 75-85]. In total, 550 large enterprises and 3.5 million civilians, or almost a tenth of it, were evacuated

from Ukraine. Also, from July to October 23, 1941, 1,667.4 thousand tons of grain and 269.5 thousand tons of grain products, a large amount of hides, wool, and fur were exported [74, p. 34, 35].

Along with the evacuation of industrial enterprises, railway workers faced a difficult task - to preserve the rolling stock of highways. There was a great need for it on the back roads. He had to replenish the rolling stock that was failing. The evacuation had to be carried out in difficult conditions of the front-line zone. The army command tried to use the transport until the last minute, until the decision was made to retreat. Therefore, the Road Administration often had to coordinate this process with the military councils of the armies and fronts. Thus, on June 24, 1941, the management of the Lviv Railway appealed to the commander of the 6th Army with a request to evacuate the rolling stock of the Rava-Ruska station. Only after receiving the permission, on July 26 and 27, railwaymen ensured the departure of 437 steam locomotives and 16,081 wagons. Part of the rolling stock could not be removed. 917 wagons, armored trains, and 317 locomotives remained on the territory captured by the fascists [75, p. 9, 10].

During the retreat, the railwaymen tried to transport not only rolling stock, but also the upper canvas, which served not only to ensure the operation of rear roads, but also as raw material for metallurgical plants. The fact that the railwaymen did not have time to evacuate, special formations of the Narkost of the communication routes put them in an unusable state.

On November 10, 1941, the main tracks were dismantled: Stalin's railway - 118.1 kilometers, Southern - 15, South - Donetsk - 123, North Donetsk - 368.2, a total of 824.3 km. Of this number: 304.2 km were taken out on Stalinskaya, 13 on the South, 51 on the South-Donetsk, 196.8 on the North-Donetsk. A total of 565. Station tracks were also disassembled: on Stalinskaya - 108.7, South Donetsk - 0.8, and North Donetsk - 10.5. A total of 120 km, of which they took out: Stalinsky - 87.4, South Donetsk - 0.8, North Donetsk - 4.5. Only 92.7 km. Turnpikes were dismantled: 304 on Stalinskaya Road, 590 on North Donetsk Road. A total of 894. 725 turnpikes were removed [87, p. 13].

The evacuation of enterprise equipment, rolling stock, and qualified personnel made it possible to attract significant human resources to increase military production.

The German invaders well understood the strategic importance of railways. V. Suvorov also noted: "The German army was tied to the roads. She could not act without them... Tactical support was carried out by cars and trucks, strategically - by iron. The army demanded hundreds of thousands, millions of tons of supplies. It was not possible to transfer it from Germany to Voronezh and Cherkasy by cars or carts. Only by rails." [88, p. 316].

The transition of the military company in the summer-autumn of 1941 to a long war had a sharp effect on the reduction of the food resources of the Wehrmacht and the Reich itself. Their replenishment was supposed to take place at the expense of supplies from Ukraine. Hitler understood that for the successful conduct of military operations, he needed raw materials such as bread, fuel, ore, and rare metals, and only the USSR could provide such raw materials in the required quantity [89, p. 119]. Therefore, the invaders planned to turn the territory of Ukraine and the Volga region into the grain basket of the "new" Europe, exporting 10-12 million tons of grain annually. For the delivery of material values, the construction of a multi-track 3-meter highway from Berlin to Vladivostok was planned [90, p.85].

In pre-war Ukraine, the length of roads reached 20,102 km. The occupation administration managed to restore 15,740 km. [91, p. 173]. All this, with a few exceptions, was destroyed by the fascists during the retreat. So on the North-Donetsk, South-Donetsk, South-Donetsk, Stalinsk and South-West railways with an operational track length of 10,844 km. in pre-war times, 9,203 km were destroyed, which was 80.3 percent. Of the total number of railway bridges, 2,087, or 80.0 percent, were torn down and burned. Of the 52 locomotive depots, 34, or 70.0 percent, were destroyed. Out of 19,363 turnouts, 11,485 were destroyed. Material losses in rubles amounted to: North-Donetsk - 643,537 thousand rubles, South - 502,312 thousand, South-Donetsk - 466,715 thousand, Stalinskaya - 459,746 thousand, South-West - 700,001 thousand rubles. A total of 277,010 thousand rubles [91, p. 173].

In general, the German occupiers completely destroyed or partially destroyed

24,770 km of the 26,302 km of the total length of Ukrainian railways /in single-track terms/, [74, p. 29], 5.6 thousand bridges, 8 thousand railway stations and stations [92, p. 27]. 18 factories for the repair of rolling stock were destroyed, including those built in the years of the first five-year plans - Darnytskyi and Papasnyanskyi [74, p. 29]. The amount of damages to the railway economy of Ukraine amounted to more than 10 billion rubles [74, p. 29].

The evacuation processes of 1941-1942, when the railroad workers tried to take not only the rolling stock, but also the upper canvas to the rear, also had an impact on the destruction of transport. What the special formations of the NKSHS did not have time to evacuate were put in an unusable state. Also, the subversive activities of underground and partisans in the fascist rear in 1941-44 affected the technical condition of the roads.

The battle for Ukraine reached its climax in the fall of 1943. At that time, the Ukrainian section of the front was 800-850 kilometers long. Almost half of the Soviet troops were concentrated within its borders - 30 combined arms, 10 tank, and 7 air armies [93].

During 1943-44, 1 defensive, 11 strategic and 23 front operations took place on its territory. The troops of six fronts - 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian and 1st and 2nd Belorussian, the Black Sea Fleet, three military flotillas, several aviation armies were involved in the liberation of the territory of the republic [94, p. 14].

(The famous film director and writer O. p. Dovzhenko wrote, "that more than half of the entire world war took place around Ukraine. More than half of all strategic operations were conducted in Ukraine. In the fall of 1943, the Dnieper was forced - one of the largest waterways in Europe [95, p. 47]. The scale of the actions required the relocation of a large number of cargoes. According to the testimony of the former People's Commissar of Communications I. V. Kovalev "... in the composition of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts there were up to five six or more armies. The relocation of each required from 160 to 200 echelons of 50 wagons each [63, p. 261].

During the summer campaign of 1944, the weight of only one combat kit of the armies, which operated in the direction of the main attack of the 1st Ukrainian Front

and other fronts, reached 5-6 thousand tons, one fuel station - 500 tons, the weight of the daily ration - 700-800 tons [96, p. 10, 70].

The technical equipment and energy supply of units of the Red Army increased. The need for military transportation increased by 12 percent [66, p. 199]. If in 1942, 1.5 million tons of ammunition and 2,662,000 tons of fuel were delivered to the troops, then in 1943 these indicators increased to 3,000,000 tons of ammunition and 3,261,000 tons of fuel [62, p. 262]. Its average daily shipment for the entire period of the Great Patriotic War reached an average of 987 tanks, in particular in 1944 - 1484, in April 1945 - 1693 tanks [97, p. 150]. According to V. Nikitin, all types of transport were used to support the Soviet troops, but first of all - railway" [97, p. 152].

The large scale of hostilities, the remoteness of the front from the rear in the absence of a developed network of highways, put railway transport among the important factors of the Red Army's invasion.

A large number of military equipment and tanks were used in the battles. And since the Soviet side simply did not have the logistical and technical capabilities to organize serious repairs in the field, the Soviet tanks remained standing on the battlefields, waiting for the rear services, which could be done only after the railways were restored, to be able to send them to the deep rear /Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, Gorky/ to transport plants [98, p. 28].

The significant importance of transport was also determined by a natural factor - the early spring of 1944. The Hero of the Soviet Union, army general, P.N. Lashchenko, emphasized the latter in his memoirs: "On the morning of March 4, 1944, the troops of the 60th Army went on the offensive, in the direction of Ternopil. The route took place in incredibly difficult conditions... The roads starting from Biloghir were so muddy that everyone walked knee-deep in thick, impassable mud. Black as tar and heavy as lead, it clung to boots and overcoats in chunks. The heavy military load was bending to the ground and people were forcefully sticking out their legs from the sticky mass to take another step... As night fell, the temperature dropped sharply. Wet, dirty overcoats and quilts were covered with ice... Icicles hung from the horses. In the cold mud, the harp and the wheels stopped turning. Therefore, in this specific case, the

Odesa-Lviv railway, for which a fierce struggle was fought, played a significant role. Hitler even issued a special order prohibiting the surrender of this important strategic hub of the city of Ternopil." [99, p. 231, 289, 291, 294, 307].

Therefore, the reconstruction of roads and bridges was an important strategic factor. Historian Yu.A. Dyakov emphasized this: "Railroads played the main role in the transport provision of the front and the rear" [57, p. 80].

Reconstruction of transport began with minimal financial support. The Soviet government allocated 39.5 billion rubles for the revival of liberated areas in 1942-45 [100, p. 261]. The state was able to provide for the revival of the national economy in 1943-45 7 percent of the amount of damage caused to Ukraine by war and occupation [101, p. 296]. For the organization of works on the restoration of the railway transport economy. In 1945, the Ukrainian SSR approved a capital investment plan in the amount of 1,062 million rubles [74, p. 25]. The annual plan for the development of funds for roads was: South-West - 137.5, North-Donetsk - 195.0, Stalinsk - 176.4, Odesa - 110.2, South-Donetsk - 104.6, Lviv - 89.1, Kovel'ska - 60.1, Vinnytsia - 55.0 million rubles [74, p. 25].

A special feature of reconstruction was the combination of various sources of financing for reconstruction works with extensive use of labor. These are labor mobilizations of workers in the industry, the civilian population of various regions, and others. Mostly, such a wide combination is characteristic of the period of reconstruction of the first stage of railways.

Among the most common are labor mobilizations of the local population. Thus, in May 1944, 6,000 workers were mobilized to rebuild the transport arteries of Vinnytsia and Kamianets-Podil'skyi regions. Subsequently, another 16,906 from the territory of Vinnytsia [76, p. 73]. On the initiative of local party bodies, in May-July 1944, 8 mass Sundays were held for the reconstruction of railway tracks, in which 60,000 residents of the Podil'sk region took part. So, on July 9, 1944, 19,861 railway workers took part in the Sunday [76, p. 75].

German prisoners of war were involved in the reconstruction of railways as well as many destroyed cities of the then USSR [102, p. 44]. 2,000 prisoners of war worked

on the Kovel railway [103, p. 31]. On the Vinnytsia highway, they restored water supply to the following stations: Kozyatyn, Vinnytsia, Zhmerinky, Rachny, Nemerchi, Sukhovole, Victoria, Starokostyantyniv [68, p. 48, 105]. In 1945, 1,500 internees and prisoners of war, mainly German subjects, were allocated for the uninterrupted operation of fuel warehouses and peat processing plants for the South-Western Railway [74, p. 24].

The use of forced labor is evidenced by a letter dated December 1, 1943 from the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union M. Khrushchev to the heads of the Oblast Executive Committees of the Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Stalin, Voroshilovgrad, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, and Kursk regions, in which it was emphasized that on the basis of the decision of the DKO dated November 22, 1943 "On urgent measures to strengthen the economy of railways liberated from the German occupiers", all employees, both mobilized and voluntarily recruited into the system of UBVR of railways, are assigned to permanent work with the distribution to them of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated April 15, 1943, "On the introduction of martial law on all railways" and "Statute on the discipline of workers and employees in railway transport". Therefore, the Central Committee of the CP/b/U asks to immediately instruct the district military committees of the mentioned regions to speed up the conscription into the Red Army and the mobilization of these workers for other types of work [74, p. 112].

In part, staffing was carried out due to the redistribution of workers between the eastern and western regions of the country, engineering and technical personnel were seconded from the roads of the Urals and Siberia. A total of 118 people were seconded in 1944, of which: 24 on the Lviv Railway, 6 on the Kovel Railway, and 1 on the Southern Donetsk Railway [74, p. 2]. Such leaders as S.V. returned. Kutafin, N.T. Zakorko, who worked before the war: the first - the head of the Southern highway, the second - Stalinskaya, P.F. Kryvonis returned to the leadership of the Pynychno-Donetsk highway. Employees of other professions should come to the new workplace.

Railway workers who were busy with its maintenance in the occupied territory and who were not ready for mobilization in the active army became the source of

replenishment of vacancies in transport. Thus, the local authorities were obliged by the resolutions of the State Defense Committee of November 22, 1943 and the RNC of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CP/b/Ukraine of November 30 of this year to mobilize for work the railway workers who remained in the territory occupied by the enemy. The party and Soviet bodies of the Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia regions and the Crimea carried out considerable work during 1944. They identified and called up 6,985 people to work on railway transport, on the Stalinskaya, Odesa - 113, South-Donetsk - 260, South-Donetsk - 29 and North-Donetsk highways. Caucasian - 193 people [74, p. 11].

The situation with the recruitment of workers for work on transport in the western Ukrainian lands was somewhat different. According to the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in May 1944, the Department of Construction and Restoration Works (UBVR) of the Kovel railway sent 1,900 former partisans from the Hero of the Soviet Union association of S. A. Kovpak, most of whom received government awards. - orders and medals for combat activity. 17 people from among former partisans worked in responsible administrative and economic positions in the apparatus of the Management of the BVR of the Kovel railway, 109 in construction sites. In addition, due to the lack of grassroots leaders in June and July 1944, partisans were trained through course education, who had seven classes of education - 75 [103, p. 150].

The involvement of partisans was required by the situation with the recruitment of labor in the territory of western Ukraine and Volyn, as evidenced, in particular, by a memo addressed to the secretary of the Central Committee of the KP/b/U, who was informed that the district executive committees of the Volyn region refused to recruit transporters lay, explaining this by the fact that there are no orders from the mobilization department of the regional executive committee [103, p. 8].

Local authorities, taking into account the special contingent of workers, tried to provide them with housing and proper living conditions, [74, p. 136] but they were not satisfactory everywhere. For example, all engineering and technical workers, employees from the 1st section of the UBVR of the Kovel railway lived, mainly, in

unrenovated, dirty dormitories. Instead of mattresses, wet reeds, which were used more than once, were used to sleep in clothes due to a lack of sheets. The plaster in the premises was falling apart, the windows were without glass. Almost all workers and partisans were not provided with shoes and warm things for the winter. Some walked barefoot. Only 25 percent of workers had clothes and shoes. There was an abundance of lice. 116 workers were ill with influenza and malaria [103, p. 73]. There were two canteens in the precincts. One is for the workers, the other is for the collective warehouse. The second was in an unsanitary condition, the first was much cleaner. There was not enough soap, bathrobes, towels, dishes, food had to be consumed from tanks made of galvanized iron. The menu is monotonous. Of the cereals, only millet was given, rarely potatoes and meat, although the first was in the subsidiary farm. There were two workshops: a shoe workshop and a sewing workshop, which were insufficiently supplied with materials [103, p. 73].

Some partisans were in a very difficult situation, such as in the village of Holishchevo, Olevsky district, Zhytomyr region. As evidenced by the inspection materials sent to the name of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine M.S. Grechukha. dated April 11, 1946. In their letters, they complained that after the reformation of the units, former partisans ended up in the UBVR of the Koval railway. Among them - Bubenko T.M., Yakovchuk Y.Ya., Ostapchuk S.F. have large families unable to work, their houses, movable and immovable property looted and destroyed by the occupiers. Families are in a difficult situation, living in dugouts. Taking this into account, the management asks to release them from work on the railway with departure to their place of residence. Other partisans who have able-bodied families are recommended to transfer them to the place of work, providing them with housing and plots of land for individual gardening if possible [103, p. 122].

The general situation in the area of the Kovel railway was not calm. On April 11, 1945, an engineer from the Kadigrov project organization arrived at the 3rd precinct of the UBVR to inspect the Kovel-Kamin-Kashirskyi line to determine the scope of work. Before starting work, the latter demanded protection from armed partisans: 15 machine guns, two machine guns, two grenades each. The last workers

to have rifles with enough ammunition. Without fulfilling these requirements, he refused to start work. The leadership had to remove partisans from other facilities, the reconstruction of which was planned for the month of April [103, p. 14].

Due to the unsatisfactory material and living conditions on the roads, staff turnover was observed. Thus, as of January 1, 1946, 40,475 people worked on the Lviv Railway [74, p. 41]. During the year, 652 workers were posted to other roads, 1,792 left for Poland, 471 resigned due to illness, 39 were called up for the army, 424 for training, 352 voluntarily left the workplace. 105 18, p. 49. In nine months of 1947, 6,352 workers left the Lviv road, including 55 in the army, 816 on retirement and death, 542 repressed by court verdict, 483 sent to courses, 483 to study 233, left due to the lack of kindergartens and nurseries - 110, voluntarily left the place of work - 499, seconded to other roads - 1006, left for Poland - 2077, due to family circumstances - 130. The turnover of personnel was especially high in the main services and the steam locomotive - 1690, movement - 1216, path - 1526 [74, p. 99].

Also, the enterprises: Lviv PRZ, Stanislavsky PVR and Stryi VRZ were almost not provided with labor force in connection with the departure of Poles [74, p. 82].

Three technical schools tried to improve the staffing situation on their own. During 1946, 15 groups studied at Lvivska. There are 4 groups in the annual school of machinists, and 8 groups in the Kolomyia technical school. A total of 295 people. Completed studies - 275 [74, p. 44].

The religiosity of local residents influenced the recruitment of personnel, especially on the roads of Western Ukraine. So, on May 24, 1945, during the celebration of Easter, most of the workers, the local population, voluntarily left work and went home, 99 workers did not show up for work after the holidays. The management of the railway was forced to turn to local party bodies to help them return the workers, as the district executive committees were not very supportive of this work [103, p. 24].

At the initial stage of reconstruction, it is noticeable that the ratio between the male and female population of working age decreased sharply throughout the republic, as every fifth resident died in the republic. Such losses had a dramatic effect on the

labor supply of transport. This is not surprising, because only 17 percent of the pre-war number of specialists remained on the territory of Ukraine freed from the fascist occupiers [104, p. 182].

In various branches of the national economy of the liberated regions, the number of able-bodied men decreased by three times. Therefore, women and youth played a decisive role in the early stages of reconstruction.

It is also worth noting that before the war the number of men was inferior to the number of women by 8.9%, but after the war this difference was 43.5%. Post-war society was mainly female [105, p. 7]. Thus, in the pre-war years, 5,404 women worked on the Southern Railway, or 1 percent, and already on January 1, 1945, there were 16,500 of them, or 36% of the total number of workers [106, p. 35].

9,773 women worked on the South-Donetsk railway, which accounted for 28.7 percent of the total number of employees, on the North-Donetsk road - 15,243 women, or 37% of the total number [74, p. 86].

The social status of railway workers was recognized in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated April 15, 1943 "On the introduction of martial law on all railways", according to which all employees in the system became mobilized for the period of war and received a postponement from mobilization to the front. For careless attitude to work, they could be punished by a military tribunal [107, p. 290]. According to the decree of the USSR Supreme Court from April 25 of the same year, a new disciplinary Statute of workers and employees in railway transport was put into effect, which declared the introduction of military discipline on all highways [70, p. 160-161].

In order to strengthen the unified leadership of the Central Committee of the CPSU/b/, on May 31, 1943, it was decided to liquidate the aviation departments in railway transport [70, p. 167].

It is worth noting that the regime at that time also used other levers to stimulate labor. Party publications intensified the propaganda of the achievements of the Stakhanovites, and also called for the resumption of socialist competition aimed at fulfilling the orders of the front [67, p. 124]. The leaders encouraged the industrial

initiative to form and increase the speed of train movement as soon as possible, timely repair of wagons, steam locomotives, tracks in order to ensure mass transportation of goods for the front, [67, p. 124] reconstruction processes, which had great military and strategic significance. Along with meeting the needs of the front, the task was to carry out the necessary volume of transportation for the reconstruction of industry and agriculture. The direction of reconstruction was formulated by the DKO in the resolution of June 23, 1943 "On capital construction of railway transport in 1943" [57, p. 193].

The necessary, extremely urgent reconstruction works of the first half of 1943 were carried out within the borders of the Voroshilovgrad region, in the second half of the year - on the territory of other regions of the Left Bank. At the beginning of March 1943, 40 bridges and railway stations, as well as the North-Eastern regions of the Stalin (now Donetsk) region came under the control of the Soviet troops within the borders of the Voroshilovgrad region. In 50 days, railway workers together with the local population rebuilt 700 km of the North-Donetsk highway. main roads, bridge crossings, communication lines. From the beginning of the expulsion of the German troops until September 1943, 1,140.1 km were restored within the borders of the Voroshilovgrad region. main roads, 6 large bridges, 21 medium bridges, 68 small bridges, 800 switchbacks [74, p. 2].

Until May 10, 1944, Donbas was connected by a railway network with many regions of the country. This made it possible for the troops of the Southern and South-Western Fronts to send 37,500 wagons of cargo to the North-Donetsk road from August 10 to September 10 during the fighting for the Donetsk region [108, p. 262].

When the regions of Right Bank Ukraine were liberated, the rehabilitation norms of railway tracks were supposed to be 8 kilometers, in practice such norms came close to 11-12 kilometers per day [74, p. 167].

During the fighting for the Dnipro, 11,000 km were put to the service of the front by special forces and railwaymen. railway tracks [63, p. 270]. Since January 1944, 11 railway brigades have been operating on the territory of Right Bank Ukraine on four Ukrainian fronts, engaged in reconstruction work [63, p. 281].

The liberation of the main lines of the Lviv railway was completed by military units on July 27, 1944. Its economy was greatly destroyed. However, on July 1, 1944, 552 km were already put into operation on the Lviv highway. slyachiv, Kovel'ska - 1020 [60, p. 142-143].

At the end of 1944, 20,292 km of the republic's railways were restored and converted to the national track. [62, p. 307].

The growth of the pace of reconstruction of railways and military transport depended on the rebuilt bridges and overwater crossings across large and small rivers of Ukraine. This was especially important in the area of action of the fronts, industrial and metallurgical centers, primarily in Donbas, the cities of Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and others. On February 26, 1944, the DKO obliged the NKSHS to deploy work primarily on 37 large bridges across the Northern Donets River - 5 bridges, Dnipro - 12, Desna - 4, Sozh - 3, Pripyat - 2, Berezina - 2 bridges [74, p. 1].

Bridges near the Kondrashiv'ska station - 227 m., over the Dnipro river in the vicinity of the city of Zaporizhzhia, over the Old Dnipro river - 370 m, over the Zaporizhzhia New Dnipro bridge - 738.4 m, in the city of Dnipropetrovsk - 1,524 m. ,0 m., Kremenchuk bridge – 1003 m, Cherkas – 1175 m, Darnytskyi bridge – 1095 m. In the area of operation of the South-Western Railway, the bridges over the Dnipro River near the city of Kanev needed repair - 780 m, on the Desna River near the city of Chernihiv - a bridge with a length of 556 [74].

During their reconstruction, the railwaymen encountered enormous difficulties. The main one is the lack of qualified personnel. Therefore, a large part of the work was performed by specialized military formations of railway workers. Indicative in this regard were the actions of the roadmen of the 1st Guards Railway Brigade to ensure restoration work in Donbas. Construction of a 121.5-meter-long and 18.5-meter-high bridge over the Mokra Moskovka River began on November 2, 1943, under conditions of its complete destruction [109, p. 93]. Its commissioning was supposed to ensure the movement of trains in the direction of Crimea. The troops of the 4th and 3rd Ukrainian fronts especially needed material replenishment. The work began with the removal of destroyed flight structures under enemy artillery and mortar fire. They were conducted

by the troops of the 2nd bridge battalion. Sergeant I. Gorbunov, being at a height of 28 meters, did not stop dismantling the damaged structure. Instead of the planned 6 units, he cut 13 [109, p. 93-94]. It was no less difficult to install 15-ton frames at a height of 17 meters. The guards coped with this task [109, p. 95]. During the work, one of the frame structures had to fall into the river due to damage to the metal cable in the air. Senior sergeant V. Goltsov, having climbed the support to a height of 28 meters, fixed an additional one instead of the broken cable, which allowed him to continue work without stopping [109, p. 95-96]. On the right bank of the river, there were added difficulties with demining the bank and bridge piers. The railway guardsmen, overcoming difficulties, let the first train with military equipment pass through the bridge on November 22, 1943. The material support of the troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts improved significantly [109, p. 97].

It was important to restore the 10.9 km long bridge over the Novy and Stary Dnipro rivers in the Zaporozhye region [109, p. 99]. The start of work was prevented by the great destruction of this bridge crossing and the rupture of the Dniproges dam. A decision was made to build a new temporary bridge over the Novy Dnipro river, Khortytsia Island and the southern part of the Old Dnipro [109, p. 98]. For the second time, the railway guards had to build such a large bridge facility. The minefields on the island were especially disturbing. Greyhound. The difficulty was also that in January 1944, there was a thaw and the air temperature rose to +5-8 degrees, the snow began to melt, the rains began, and roadlessness began [109, p. 101]. Civilian railway workers and the local population came to the rescue, from which 12 labor battalions with 500 people each were formed [109, p. 100]. Snow and rain prevented the pace of work from increasing. The first stage of this bridge was put into operation on February 22, 1944, which was of particular importance during the period when the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front were engaged in intense battles with the German invaders in Right-Bank Ukraine [109, p. 102].

27,000 railway workers, family members, and representatives of the local population took part in the construction of bridge crossings and highways on the North Donetsk, South and Stalin highways [62, p. 251].

The construction of a bridge near the Darnytsia station near Kyiv was of great importance for increasing the pace of offensive operations in Right-Bank Ukraine. The Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front set the deadline for its construction - 20 days. Railroad workers delivered 5,000 cubic meters of lumber, more than 100 piles, and 150 tons of metal forgings [62, p. 252]. In order to intensify reconstruction work, 6,000 people of various specialties from the civilian population were mobilized. Therefore, work was carried out around the clock. Another part of the railway workers and the local population was engaged in the construction of the 1,195-meter-long high-water Podolsky Bridge. For this, it was necessary to drive 2,146 supports, install intermediate structures weighing more than 200 tons, and fill about 100,000 cubic meters of soil [62, p. 253].

Work began on December 15, 1943 and ended on February 20, 1944 [108, p. 280]. 48,000 man-days, or 45.4 man-days per linear meter of the bridge, were spent on the construction of a railway bridge in the Kyiv region. The average recovery rate was 81.5 running meters per day [63, p. 266-267]. In general, 37 large and small bridges were built by January 15, 1944 at the Kyiv branch of the South-Western Railway with the help of special formations of the NKSHS [108, p. 281]. This greatly helped speed up the transfer of forces and means to repulse the counteroffensive of German troops from the area west of Fastov and south of the city of Zhytomyr, which they launched on November 15 with the aim of capturing Kyiv.

The resumption of transport was of great economic importance. Thus, more than a thousand kilometers of railway tracks ran through the territory of Zhytomyr region, there were about 100 junctions and such large stations as Korosten, Zhytomyr, Novograd-Volynsk, Berdychiv, Ovruch, Bilokorovychi [74, p. 30].

An important consequence of the Second World War was the completion of the cathedralization of Ukrainian lands. To a certain extent, the railways of Western Ukraine and, since October 1944, Transcarpathia became the real mechanism of their integration in such a union. On the territory of the latter, there was a railway network with a length of 653 km, of which 168 km - the Union track, 345 km - the Western European track and 140 km of narrow tracks. The connected railway network consisted

of 4 railway lines, three of which crossed the territory of Transcarpathia from the north-east to the south-west in the direction of Uzhgorod-Chop, Skotarske-Batevo, 3ymyr-Vyshkiv and one - from east to west in the direction of Chop- Vyshkiv [74, p. 5].

The steam locomotive fleet consisted of 85 steam locomotives of various types, of which 69 were Western European gauge, 2 were Union gauge, and 14 were narrow gauge. The equipment of the locomotive industry was partially destroyed during the war years and was not repaired. At that time, locomotive depots were not equipped with machinery, did not have devices for repairing locomotives, and were loaded manually.

The wagon fleet consisted of 3,000 freight wagons and 113 passenger wagons. Out of 72 station premises, 38 were destroyed. The telephone connection was in an unsatisfactory condition. The material reserves of the road were taken away by the enemy [74, p. 61].

In 1944-1945, 3,376 people worked on the railway, including 1,125 Ukrainians; 1338 - Russians, 597 - Slovaks and others [74, p. 61].

The territory of Transcarpathia was connected to the road network of the USSR mainly through three sections: Sambor-Syanok-Uzhrorod, Stryi-Lavochno-Mukachevo, Kolomyia-Delyatyn-Rakhiv. From the very beginning, train traffic took place along the temporarily restored Stryi-Lavochno-Mukachevo track. Three tunnels with a total length of 800 meters must be rebuilt in this section, two of which were located on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. On May 3, 1945, on another section - Kolomyia-Delyatyn-Rakhiv, the temporary movement of trains was opened through three tunnels, in which passage was provided with the help of temporary risers and wooden fasteners that protected the echelons from rocks. The Sambir-Syanok-Uzhhorod line had 7 collapsed tunnels destroyed throughout. Their restoration was not included in the work plan for 1945. The works were carried out by the forces of the Lviv Railway on the Lviv-Sambir section with a length of 20 km. By the decree of the Central Committee of Ukraine dated May 6, 1945, the capital reconstruction of the Stryi-Lavochno-Mukachevo railway sections was entrusted to the special office of the NKSHS "Holovtunelmagistral" with a deadline of July 15, 1945. On the Kolomyia-

Delyatyn-Rakhiv line, work was entrusted to the UVBR with the completion of October 1, 1945. In this year, the Lviv Railway needed 6,000 people to carry out work on the restoration of connections with Transcarpathian Ukraine, in fact, at the beginning of the work, there were 3,000 people, of which 800 people were going to leave for Poland [74, p. 61].

The material and living conditions of the workers were quite difficult. The lack of a centralized supply of food products and workwear had a negative impact on the situation. There were high prices for basic necessities, which created negative attitudes among workers. This happened due to the absence of labor supply enterprises, because they were not legally registered, there was a lack of working capital and state loans [74, p. 61]. These and other circumstances made it difficult to recruit workers for the roads of Transcarpathia.

The leadership of the republic, taking into account the economic condition of the region, ethnographic features, existing weak technical equipment, backwardness and neglect of the railway industry, decided to provide assistance to Transcarpathian Ukraine by creating the Transcarpathian Railway. In the name of Y. Stalin, reports and a draft resolution of the DKO were sent, which defined the boundaries of the railway and the list of necessary preparatory works that needed to be carried out by November 1, 1945. The railway was to include 800 km of broad track, 140 km of narrow track, in addition to lowland lines and mountain lines, which were located on the territory of Drogobyt'sk, Stanislav'sk, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi regions, with a total length of 1,740 km. The border of the railway was along the Lviv road stations Sambor, Stryi (including), Khodoriv, Pidvyske and Berezovitsa, Ostriv (including), Chisinau - Oknytsia station (including), Vinnytsia - St. Husyatyn and Mohyliv-Podil'skyi (including) The road management was to be located in Stanislav, in the premises of the former Directorate of Polish Railways.

They also planned to organize food and industrial supplies by sending the necessary amount of overalls and shoes, as well as allocate 25,000 sq. meters of the housing stock for management officials and employees.¹⁵⁴ The costs of measures for the organization of the road were to amount to 5 million rubles. This project could not

be implemented, which did not prevent the rapid reconstruction of the Transcarpathian railway network. During 1944-45, the railway connection with the region was carried out through 9 rebuilt tunnels, including the Beskydy tunnel, located on the Mukachevo-Stry line, with a length of 1,800 meters. The main buildings of stations, depots, and water supply were restored. The restoration work plan was completed in 1944 by 86%, in 1945 by 77% [74, p. 30].

At the high pace of reconstruction at that time and significant volumes of work, there were cases when bureaucratic red tape, all kinds of procrastination, incoherence of actions slowed down the work. This happened during the reconstruction of the Zhmeryn Carriage Repair Plant. Due to some incoherence, the Kharkiv design organization "Transzahidproekt" only started preparing the design task in December 1944, with its subsequent approval by the NKSHS. Due to the bureaucratic red tape, the DKO did not have time to adopt a special resolution on the reconstruction of the plant in a timely manner. Therefore, the workforce of the enterprise in the fourth quarter of 1944 was left without the necessary centralized supply of building materials. In fact, from December 1944 to February 1945, work at the enterprise was almost stopped, [74, p. 11] with the exception of small items and the installation of some equipment. The volume of the completed works amounted to only 42.3 thousand rubles [68, p. 5]. In the first quarter of 1945, the situation did not change. Thus, the Kharkiv institution made certain corrections in the design task with the aim of partial repurposing of the enterprise - simultaneous repair of passenger and freight cars. Therefore, at the end of the first quarter of 1945, restoration work did not begin in full due to the impossibility of providing them with materials. In order to somehow improve the situation, party and state bodies on the ground planned to provide the work front with materials of their own production [68, p. 7].

Without the normal operation of the railway in the liberated areas of Ukraine, there could be no question of rebuilding and putting into operation the pre-war industrial potential.

DKO twice, on February 26 and October 22, 1943, considered the issue of aid measures for the restoration of the coal industry and mines of Donbas [110, p. 169].

The scope of work was determined for the fourth quarter of 1943 and the whole of 1944. It was supposed to restore the activity of 209 mine shafts with a total length of 55,400 m and pump out 117 million tons of water. The railway workers provided assistance to the miners. They delivered equipment, machines, tools, and materials from all over the USSR. They transported 53 wagons with mining equipment from Kuibyshev region, 23 wagons from Kuzbass. By January 1, 1944, 15 large mines with a daily production rate of 5,000 tons and 16 small ones were put into operation. This made it possible to revive the Donbas coal industry in a short period of time. If in 1943 4.3 million tons of coal were mined, then in 1944 - 21 million tons, and in 1945 coal production grew to 38.4 million tons, which significantly influenced the normalization of the country's fuel balance. In this way, the miners of Dobas mined 17% of the total annual production of fuel in the USSR, in 1945 this percentage was 26.7. Railway workers delivered it to its destination. From April 1 to April 25, 1943, 1,440 wagons or 28,639 tons of coal were shipped on the South-Donetsk railway [74, p. 39].

Railroad workers contributed to the revival of the energy capacities of the metallurgical and chemical industry. During the revival of blast furnace No. 3 of the Stalin Metallurgical Plant, 200 wagons of rubble had to be removed.¹⁶⁸ At the beginning of 1944, railway workers delivered 4,500 machine tools, 6,000 cars, 7 turbines, 30,000 tons to enterprises of the coal, metallurgical, and machine-building industries. metal, 15 thousand tons of cement, 300 thousand m² of glass. At the beginning of 1945, they delivered 100 wagons of metal construction machines to the Zaporizhstal plant. Almost 75 thousand tons of industrial equipment were delivered for industrial enterprises of Ukraine, which allowed to organize the work of Dniprodzerzhynskyi, Makiivskyi, Dnipropetrovskyi. G. Petrovsky metallurgical plants.

In 1945, iron smelting in the republic amounted to 1,647 tons, or 18 percent of the level of 1940. This led to an increase in metal production, a significant part of which, namely 109,620 tons of metal, was provided by the employees of the North-Donetsk railway from September 1944 for the needs of the economy.

Railwaymen carried out the transportation for the purpose of reviving coke

plants and enterprises in the processing industry. They supplied the Azovstal plant with equipment worth 98.3 million rubles. [111, p. 84]. Pursuant to the decree of the DKO dated March 6, 1945, the equipment of the German chemical plant "Heide-Brek", the cost of which was 20 billion, was transported to the industrial site of the Lysichan Nitrogen Plant. gold rubles. Additionally, 12 km of tracks were laid at the plant.

At the same time, agricultural production was revived. Already in 1945, the cultivated area was 23 million hectares. For the transportation of grain products, special ring routes have been organized by the railways of Ukraine. There were 120 of them on the Stalin railway, 100 on the Odesa railway, and 85 on the Southern railway.

The timely supply of raw materials and food products to various regions of Ukraine contributed to the revival and improvement of the work of many spheres of society's life.

Ukrainian railwaymen during the last war carried out a huge volume of front-line, evacuation, national economic and passenger transport. This was achieved due to the use of the then economic methods of management of the industry, party - political leadership at that time by the Communist Party, which in many respects used military methods of management [57, p. 370]. The facts prove that the railway system of Ukraine and its employees withstood the military burdens with dignity.

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